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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the study of the Pareto-eﬃciency of the
competitive equilibrium for an overlapping generations economy with
endogenous fertility. Pareto-eﬃciency needs a reformulation when fer-
tility is endogenous. Then it is proved that a competitive equilibrium
that converges in over-accumulation is non-Pareto-eﬃcient. However,
we provide an example in which a competitive equilibrium that con-
verges in under-accumulation is non-Pareto-eﬃcient. Finally, we give
a general condition that ensures the Pareto-eﬃciency of the competi-
tive equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to the study of the Pareto-eﬃciency of the competitive
equilibrium for an overlapping generations economy with endogenous fertility.
The problem is well-known when fertility is exogenous. Considering the
standard overlapping generations model (cf. Diamond [7]), three types of
steady states may exist in a competitive economy: under-accumulation, the
golden rule or over-accumulation. The two first steady states are Pareto-
optimal when the third is not. Moreover, for an inter-temporal dynamic
equilibrium converging towards a steady state, if this steady state is in under-
accumulation, the equilibrium trajectory is Pareto-optimal; if the steady
state is in over-accumulation, the equilibrium trajectory is not Pareto-optimal.
These results are carefully presented in De la Croix and Michel [6].
What happens to these properties when fertility is endogenous?
Before answering this question, we must clarify some basic assumptions
and concepts. On the one hand, we must choose a theoretical framework that
endogenizes the fertility decisions. On the other hand, we need to reconsider
the notion of Pareto-eﬃciency in a context where fertility is endogenous:
Pareto-eﬃciency is a notion that is basically defined for a given set of agents.
In the literature, there have been many approaches that endogenize fertil-
ity decisions. The benchmark framework consists in assuming that children
are a consumption good, which appear in the utility function of the parents.
The basic references are the articles by Becker [1], Willis [14] and Eckstein
and Wolpin [8]1. Moreover, we focus on the case of identical agents in each
generation: we consider one representative agent by generation.
The second point at issue is the definition of the Pareto-eﬃciency when
fertility is endogenous. We introduce a concept called “Representative-Consumer”
eﬃciency (or RC-eﬃciency), which refers to an allocation (which satisfies the
resource constraint of the economy), for which no other allocation exists that
would lead to a higher level of utility for all generations with a strict improve-
ment for (at least) one generation. In the sense of this definition, the only
criterion is the utility of each generation. Thus, an allocation that improves
the utility level of one (or many) generation(s) to the detriment of the size
of one (or many) generation(s) is considered preferable. For that reason, it
is possible to think of another notion, which add to the preceding notion
an additional constraint: an allocation can dominate another one only if it
1Other approaches have been developed in the literature based on the additional as-
sumption of descendant altruism, as in Becker and Barro [2]. Another way of endogenizing
fertility (cf. Nishimura and Zhang [12]) is to introduce ascendant altruism and strategic
behaviors of parents.
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includes at least an equal number of children in each period. But, as a result
of our study, we will see that this second notion does not lead to a diﬀer-
ent classification of competitive equilibria. Therefore we will concentrate our
study on the basic notion
We reach the following results.
First, we present the model and give the precise conditions that ensure
the existence and the uniqueness of the inter-temporal equilibrium. Sec-
ond, we focus on the eﬃciency properties of the competitive equilibrium.
Clearly a competitive equilibrium that converges in over-accumulation is not
RC-eﬃcient, as a consequence of the comparison with unchanged popula-
tion. More surprisingly, a competitive equilibrium that converges in under-
accumulation can be RC-dominated. This result is shown by a simple exam-
ple: starting from the competitive equilibrium, we build an allocation that
gives a higher fertility and leaves the consumption levels unchanged.
Finally, considering a competitive equilibrium which converges in under-
accumulation, we give a suﬃcient condition to ensure that this trajectory is
RC-eﬃcient. This condition is that the limit value of the wage does not make
it possible to finance a fertility level that is higher than the limit value of the
interest factor.
Our results can be compared with existing literature.
In a framework close to ours, Eckstein and Wolpin [8] focus on the op-
timal stationary state. They do not, however, precisely state the suﬃcient
conditions that ensure the concavity of the optimization problem2.
As for the problem of the existence and uniqueness of the inter-temporal
equilibriumwith endogenous fertility, Raut and Srinivasan [13] and Chakrabarti
[4] consider models that are close to ours. They particularly focus on the oc-
currence of multiple equilibria, indetermination and complex dynamics.
Two recent papers are concerned with the definition of Pareto-eﬃciency
criteria in an endogenous fertility framework. Conde-Ruiz, Giménez and
Perez-Nievas [5] present two definitions of Pareto eﬃciency that are close to
ours. They apply these notions to a model in which the only productive
factor is human capital, and they do not study the eﬃciency properties of
the competitive equilibrium.
Golosov, Jones and Tertilt [9] are concerned with the definition of Pareto-
eﬃciency notions in a general framework with heterogeneous agents. They
propose two notions called P-eﬃciency and A-eﬃciency. One diﬀerence with
our approach is that their notion of P-eﬃciency depends on the utility level
assigned to “unborn” agents. On the contrary, our notions of eﬃciency are
defined independently of any reference to the utility of “unborn” agents. In
2Even if they mention that they obtain such conditions for a Cobb-Douglas economy.
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a framework with homogenous generations, their notion of A-eﬃciency cor-
responds to our notion of RC-eﬃciency. For a suﬃciently low level of utility
assigned to unborn agents, their notion of P-eﬃciency corresponds to our
notion of CRC-eﬃciency. But the main diﬀerence with our approach is that
they study a class of models with the particular notion of “P-equilibrium”
which do not include our model. Indeed, for the class of models that they
consider, they find that all P-equilibrium is P-eﬃcient, when we consider a
model where the equilibrium can be ineﬃcient.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section two presents the
model. Section three defines and studies the inter-temporal equilibrium.
Section four defines Pareto eﬃciency when fertility is endogenous, and gives
suﬃcient conditions for non-eﬃciency. Section five gives a suﬃcient condition
for ensuring that a competitive equilibrium converging in under-accumulation
is eﬃcient. Section six presents our conclusions. The most demanding proofs
can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
We make use of an overlapping generations model. Each individual lives for
two periods. She or he inelastically supplies one unit of labor during her/his
youth and retires in old age. During their first period of life, agents work,
consume save and choose their number of children. Children entail a cost for
their parents. In their second period of life, agents consume the proceeds of
theirs savings.
2.1 Consumers
At each date t, the new generation is populated with a number Nt of identical
agents. Each agent is endowed with an inter-temporal utility function:
U(ct, dt+1,mt) (1)
with (ct, dt+1,mt) ∈ R3+. ct and dt+1 are respectively the consumptions of
good during youth and old age, and mt is the number of children3. The
number of agents of the generation t+ 1 is thus equal to:
Nt+1 = mtNt (2)
3As usual, we consider mt as a continuous variable. This assumption is consistent with
a model which assumes identical agents within each generation.
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Assumption 1 : U is a function from R3+ to R∪ {−∞} , and U maps R3++
to R, with4:
U(c¯, d¯, m¯) = lim
(c,d,m)∈R3++
(c,d,m)→(c¯,d¯,m¯)
U(c, d,m) for every (c¯, d¯, m¯) ∈ R3+/R3++ (3)
U is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on R3++, strictly concave, increasing in
each argument and satisfies the Inada conditions:
lim
c→0
U 0c = limd→0U
0
d = limm→0
U 0m = +∞
The budget constraints faced by a generation t agent are:
ct + φmt + st = wt (4)
dt+1 = Rt+1st (5)
where wt is the wage earned during period t, st the savings, and Rt+1 the
gross return in t + 1 on savings. Each child entails a constant educational
cost φ.
From (4) and (5), the lifetime budget constraint can be stated as:
ct +
dt+1
Rt+1
+ φmt = wt
With assumption 1, maximizing the utility function under the lifetime
budget constraint leads to the following first-order conditions, which are nec-
essary and suﬃcient:
U 0ct = Rt+1U
0
dt+1 =
U 0mt
φ
This enables us to write the following demand functions:
ct = c(wt, Rt+1) (6)
mt = m(wt, Rt+1) (7)
st = s(wt, Rt+1) (8)
dt+1 = d(wt, Rt+1) (9)
Functions c, m, s and d are defined on R2++ and are continuously diﬀeren-
tiable.
4Equation (3) means that a unique limit exists, independent of the converging (c, d,m)
sequence chosen.
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2.2 Firms
At each period t one competitive firm exists, which produces Yt quantity of
good, according to a production function with two inputs (capital: Kt; labor:
Lt), and constant returns:
Yt = F (Kt, Lt)
The capital fully depreciates within the production period. We can define f
as: f(k) ≡ F (k, 1).
Assumption 2: f : R+ → R+, and for all k > 0, f 0(k) > 0 and f 00(k) < 0.
The profit maximization of the firm gives:
wt = F 0L(Kt, Lt) = f(Kt/Lt)− (Kt/Lt)f 0(Kt/Lt) ≡ w(Kt/Lt)
Rt = F 0K(Kt, Lt) = f 0(Kt/Lt) ≡ R(Kt/Lt)
3 The inter-temporal equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
The initial conditions are the following. At period t = 0, N−1 old agents and
N0 young agents are living. The old agents hold equal shares of the capital
stock K0. This stock comes from their past savings behavior: K0 = N−1s−1.
The consumption of the old agents can then be given by:
d0 = R0K0/N−1
Along an inter-temporal equilibrium, all markets are balanced.
The labor market is balanced at each period: Lt = Nt, with Nt follow-
ing the relation : Nt+1 = mtNt. Prices result from the firms’ behavior at
equilibrium:
Rt = R(kt) and wt = w(kt) with: kt = Kt/Nt
The commodity market is balanced, or:
F (Kt, Nt) = Ntct +Nt−1dt +Kt+1 +Ntφmt
Taking consumer’s budget constraints into account, this last relation is equiv-
alent to:
Kt+1 = Ntst
Finally, using optimal behaviors and equilibrium conditions, it is possible to
give the definition of the inter-temporal equilibrium:
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Definition 1 Starting from initial conditions N−1, N0, K0 and d0 = R0K0/N−1,
an inter-temporal equilibrium is a sequence (Kt, Nt, ct, dt,mt)t≥0 , which sat-
isfies:
ct +
dt+1
Rt+1
+ φmt = wt (10)
U 0ct = Rt+1U
0
dt+1 =
U 0mt
φ
(11)
Nt+1 = mtNt (12)
F (Kt, Nt) = Ntct +Nt−1dt +Kt+1 +Ntφmt (13)
with Rt = R(kt) and wt = w(kt) where: kt = Kt/Nt (14)
All equilibrium variables can be expressed as functions of the variable kt.
This property leads to the following simple characterization:
Proposition 1 An inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by a sequence
(kt)t≥0 with kt > 0, such that: k0 = K0/N0 is given, and ∀t ≥ 0,
m [w(kt), R(kt+1)] kt+1 − s [w(kt), R(kt+1)] = 0 (15)
The proof is straightforward. From the sequence (kt)t≥0, the sequence
of prices can be defined by (14). Individual variables (ct, st,mt, dt+1)t≥0 are
given by (6), (7), (8) and (9). All equilibrium conditions are thus satisfied.¥
3.2 Suﬃcient conditions for the existence and unique-
ness of the inter-temporal equilibrium
We define the function ∆ as:
∆(w, k) = m(w, f 0(k))k − s(w, f 0(k))
∆ is defined onR2++ and is continuously diﬀerentiable. The dynamic equation
(15) can be written as:
∆ (w(kt), kt+1) = 0
A suﬃcient condition for the existence of an inter-temporal equilibrium
(kt)t≥0 is that for all w > 0, there exists k > 0, such that ∆(w, k) = 0.
Moreover, if ∀w > 0, the equation ∆(w, k) = 0 has a unique solution k,
and thus, the inter-temporal equilibrium starting from the initial stock k0 =
K0/N0 > 0 is unique.
We introduce a new assumption on the utility function U(c, d,m) in order
to prove the existence and uniqueness of the inter-temporal equilibrium:
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Assumption 3: c and m are gross substitutes to the good consumed during
the second period of life d, that is c0R ≤ 0 and m0R ≤ 0.
A consequence of this assumption is that the savings function (8) increases
with R. Indeed, as (6), (7) and (8) are such that (4) holds, we have:
s0R = −c0R − φm0R ≥ 0 (16)
Example 1 : Let us assume that the utility function U is additively separa-
ble, following U(c, d,m) = u1(c) + u2(d) + v(m), with u01 > 0, u02 > 0, v0 > 0,
u001 < 0, u002 < 0, v00 < 0. In that case, assumption 3 is satisfied iif the elasticity
of u02(d) is not smaller than −1 : du002(d)/u02(d) ≥ −1.
The following proposition proves the existence and uniqueness of the inter-
temporal equilibrium.
Proposition 2 : Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, ∀k0 > 0, a unique inter-
temporal equilibrium (kt)t≥0 exists starting from a given initial condition k0 >
0.
Proof: The proof establishes that for all w > 0, a unique value k > 0 exists,
such that∆(w, k) = 0. Let us first note that∆ is a strictly increasing function
of k. Indeed,
∆0k(w, k) = m (w, f 0(k)) + km0Rf 00(k)− s0Rf 00(k) ≥ m (w, f 0(k)) > 0
Thus, uniqueness is guaranteed.
The existence is proved by studying the limits of∆ for k → 0 and k →∞.
When k goes to 0, it can be bounded in such a way that: k < 1 ⇒ f 0(k) >
f 0(1). We then obtain the following inequalities:
m(w, f 0(k)) ≤ m(w, f 0(1)), s(w, f 0(k)) ≥ s(w, f 0(1))
and thus:
∆(w, k) ≤ km(w, f 0(1))− s(w, f 0(1))
Finally we have:
lim
k→0
∆(w, k) ≤ −s(w, f 0(1)) < 0
When k goes to +∞, it can be bounded in such a way that: k > 1 ⇒
f 0(k) < f 0(1). We then obtain the following inequality:
∆(w, k) ≥ km(w, f 0(1))− s(w, f 0(1))
Thus:
lim
k→+∞
∆(w, k) = +∞
The continuity of ∆ makes it possible to conclude that k exists, such that
∆(w, k) = 0.¥
8
3.3 Converging inter-temporal equilibria
Definition 2 An inter-temporal equilibrium (Kt, Nt, ct, dt,mt)t≥0 is said to
be converging if the sequence kt = Kt/Nt converges to a limit k > 0 when t
goes to infinity.
If kt converges to a limit k, it is straightforward to show that Rt = R(kt),
wt = w(kt), ct, dt and mt are converging to constant values R, w, c, d, and
m.
Definition 3 A converging inter-temporal equilibrium (Kt, Nt, ct, dt,mt)t≥0
is said to converge in under-accumulation if R > m. It is said to converge in
over-accumulation if R < m.
An example of converging inter-temporal equilibria can be obtained when
homothetic utility functions are considered. In this case, equations (6), (7),
(8) and (9) take the following forms:
ct = wtγ1(Rt+1) (17)
φmt = wtγ3(Rt+1) (18)
st = dt/Rt+1 = wtγ2(Rt+1) (19)
where the functions γi(R) are such that: γ1(R)+γ2(R)+γ3(R) = 1. Assump-
tion 3 is equivalent to γ01(R) ≤ 0 and γ03(R) ≤ 0, which implies γ02(R) ≥ 0.
The equilibrium dynamics (15) become:
kt+1 =
st
mt
=
φγ2(Rt+1)
γ3(Rt+1)
(20)
Under assumption 3, this equation has a unique solution kt+1 = k. The
economy reaches in one period its stationary state k defined by:
kγ3
£
R(k)
¤
= φγ2
£
R(k)
¤
(21)
This property comes from the homothetic utility function. As st and mt are
proportional to wt, kt+1 no longer depends on wt. The two adjustments in
savings and fertility lead to a constant ratio Kt+1/Nt+1 in one period.
4 Eﬃcient allocations and endogenous fertil-
ity
In this section, we show that the concept of Pareto optimality needs a new
definition in a framework of endogenous fertility. We first introduce the basic
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notion of feasible allocations. This allows us to introduce diﬀerent notions
of eﬃciency. Finally, we give suﬃcient conditions for the non-eﬃciency of a
competitive equilibrium.
4.1 Feasible allocations with representative consumers
First, we can define the notion of a feasible allocation with representative con-
sumers as an inter-temporal allocation that satisfies the resource constraints
of the economy.
Definition 4 (RC-allocation) A feasible allocation with representative con-
sumers (or RC-allocation) is a sequence (Kt, Nt, ct, dt, mt)t≥0 of positive
variables that satisfy ∀t ≥ 0 :
F (Kt, Nt) = Kt+1 +Ntct +Nt−1dt +Nt+1φ
Nt+1 = mtNt
(22)
For a competitive equilibrium, the initial conditionsN−1, N0, K0 and d0 =
R0K0/N−1 are given. Following definition 4, an inter-temporal equilibrium
is a feasible allocation, which satisfies equations (10), (11) and (14). From
assumption 1, if K0, N0 and N−1 are positive, all the variables (Kt, Nt, ct,
dt, mt)t≥0 will be positive.
Remark 1 To simplify the presentation, we will always consider the four
initial quantities (N−1, N0, K0, d0) as given. Thus, it will be hereafter implicit
that all feasible allocations or competitive equilibria considered will start from
these same initial conditions, even if they are not mentioned.
A new characterization of feasible RC-allocations will be useful in the
sequel. In equation (22), ct and mt are chosen by generation t agents when
dt is determined by generation t− 1 agents. By a simple change in variables,
we can introduce a new definition of feasible allocations, in which all variables
are decided by the same generation.
Lemma 1 (Characterizations of feasible RC-allocations) Any feasible
RC-allocation can be characterized as a sequence (Yt, Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 of
positive variables starting from the initial condition Y0 = F (K0, N0) − D0,
and satisfying ∀t ≥ 0,
Yt+1 = F (Yt − Ct − φZt, Zt)−Dt+1
Nt+1 = Zt
Yt > Ct + φZt
(23)
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Proof: This result is immediately obtained by a simple change in variables:
Ct = Ntct, Dt = Nt−1dt and Yt = Kt+1 + Ct + φZt.¥
Remark 2 Let
¡
Kt, N t, ct, dt,mt
¢
t≥0 be an inter-temporal equilibrium. Along
such a trajectory, the new variable Yt is equal to:
Y t = N twt = N tF 0L
¡
Kt, N t
¢
We restrict our analysis to allocations that give the same levels of con-
sumption and fertility for agents belonging to the same generation (RC-
allocations). As agents are identical within a generation, we will henceforth
use the terms “the utility of a generation” to mean the utility level obtained
by each agent belonging to this generation. In no way, this expression refers
to an evaluation of the well-being of a generation measured by some social
criterion. It is only a short cut to designate the utility level of each agent
within a given generation.
4.2 Eﬃciency of RC-allocations
Pareto-eﬃciency is usually defined for a given set of agents. The model with
endogenous fertility introduces a new diﬃculty, because the set of agents is
the result of individual behaviors. Moreover, we only consider the case of
identical agents within each generation, and we need a definition allowing to
compare RC-feasible allocation.
In a basic framework with exogenous fertility and heterogeneous agents,
the standard definition of Pareto-dominance would be the following. A first
feasible allocation Pareto-dominates a second one if each agent in the first al-
location obtains at least as much utility as in the second one, with a strict im-
provement for at least one agent. If we restrict the analysis to RC-allocations
(allocations with identical agents within each generation), a first feasible al-
location Pareto-dominates a second one if each generation in the first one
obtains at least as much utility as in the second one, with a strict improve-
ment for at least one generation5. As all agents within a generation are
identical, the first allocation must not only improve the utility of one agent
in one generation, but of all the agents of this generation too.
Finally, we have to deal with endogenous fertility. We introduce a first
concept that is only concerned with the utility of each generation.
5By the utility of a generation, we again refer to the utility of each agent belonging to
this generation.
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Definition 5 (RC-dominance) 6 Let (Kit , N it , cit, dit, mit)t≥0 for i = 1, 2
be two feasible RC-allocations. Allocation 1 is said to RC-dominates alloca-
tion 2 if it leads to a higher level of utility for all generations, with a strict
improvement for (at least) one generation. Formally,
∀t ≥ 0, U(c1t , d1t+1,m1t ) ≥ U(c2t , d2t+1,m2t )
∃t0 ≥ 0, such that: U(c1t0 , d
1
t0+1,m
1
t0) > U(c
2
t0 , d
2
t0+1,m
2
t0)
In the sense of this definition, the only criterion is the utility of each
representative consumer within each generation. Thus, a feasible allocation
that improves the utility level of one (or many) generation(s) to the detriment
of the size of one (or many) generation(s) is considered preferable. This
notion can be criticized, because it makes it possible to diminish the number
of agents. For that reason, it is possible to think of a second notion, for
which an allocation can dominate another only if it includes at least an
equal number of children in each period. We call this alternative notion
CRC-dominance7. Formally, we must add to the preceding definition the
constraints:
∀t ≥ 0, m1t ≥ m2t
It is straightforward that CRC-dominance implies RC-dominance, but the
converse is a priori false.
From these notions of dominance, it follows two notions of eﬃciency:
Definition 6 An RC-allocation is said to be RC-eﬃcient (respectively CRC-
eﬃcient), if there does not exist another RC-allocation that RC-dominates
(respectively CRC-dominates) it.
It is straightforward that a RC-eﬃcient allocation also is CRC-eﬃcient,
but the converse a priori is false. We will mainly concentrate on the first no-
tion (RC-eﬃciency). Indeed, as a result of our study, it will appear that these
two notions lead to the same classification of competitive equilibria. The rea-
son behind this result is that non-RC-eﬃcient equilibria are dominated by
allocations that include a higher level of fertility.
4.3 Conditions that ensure the non-RC-eﬃciency of a
competitive equilibrium
In this section, we prove two results. The first one shows that a competitive
equilibrium that converges in over-accumulation is not RC-eﬃcient (and not
6RC-dominance means dominance for Representative Consumers.
7CRC-dominance means dominance in Children for Representative Consumers.
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CRC-eﬃcient). It is a direct extension of the standard result for an economy
with exogenous fertility.
The second result is more surprising. It shows that a competitive equi-
librium that converges in under-accumulation can be RC-dominated (and
CRC-dominated). This result is shown using a simple example.
4.3.1 The in-eﬃciency of an inter-temporal equilibrium that con-
verges in over-accumulation (m > R)
We consider that
¡
Kt, N t, ct, dt,mt
¢
t≥0 is an inter-temporal equilibrium that
converges in over-accumulation: mt and Rt = F 0K(Kt, N t) respectively con-
verge into m and R, such that m > R. Thus, such an equilibrium is not
RC-eﬃcient. Indeed, we know that such a trajectory is not Pareto-optimal
with an exogenous population, that is, when this allocation is compared to
feasible allocations with the same population (∀t, mt = mt). Thus, this
allocation cannot be RC—eﬃcient with endogenous fertility.
This first result gives a necessary condition for a converging equilibrium
to be RC-eﬃcient: it must converge in under-accumulation or towards the
“golden rule” (m = R). When fertility is exogenous, converging in under-
accumulation is a suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium to be Pareto-optimal.
When fertility is endogenous, the question is to know if this result still holds.
4.3.2 A competitive equilibrium that converges in under-accumulation
can be non-RC-eﬃcient
This property is shown in an example. We use a log-linear utility function
and a CES production function:
Ut = γ1 ln ct + γ2 ln dt+1 + γ3 lnmt (24)
F (K,L) = A
³
K
τ−1
τ + bL
τ−1
τ
´ τ
τ−1
(25)
The economy reaches the stationary state k = φγ2/γ3 in one period. The
following result is proved:
Proposition 3 For utility and production functions given by (24) and (25),
if the following conditions hold,
γ3 < φ/b < γ2 (26)
φ/b− γ3 <
(γ2 − γ3)
2
4γ2
(27)
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and if the elasticity of production τ is large enough, the stationary equilibrium
k is in under-accumulation and a feasible allocation, which oﬀers the same
levels for consumption and a higher fertility level, exists. Thus, this allocation
(C)RC-dominates the competitive equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix 1.¥
Conditions (26) and (27) can be understood as follows. The inequality
γ3 < φ/b ensures that the competitive equilibrium is associated with under-
accumulation for τ when it is large enough. The inequality φ/b < γ2 makes it
possible to define a feasible allocation that (C)RC-dominates the competitive
equilibrium, such that the fertility level is higher thanR. Finally, (27) ensures
that the competitive equilibrium R is close to m.
The interpretation of the result is easier at the limit for τ = +∞. At
each period, along the dominating trajectory, the economy accumulates less
capital, because more resources are devoted to child-rearing. Thus, capital
accumulation diminishes when the quantity of labor increases. The more the
production factors are substitutable in the technology, the smaller the loss
in production. When τ = +∞, the gross return on capital is constant and
equal to A. Along the dominating trajectory, the fertility level m is fixed at
a value higher than A = R.
5 Suﬃcient conditions for the RC-eﬃciency
of an inter-temporal equilibrium
In this section, using general functions for utility and production, we give
a suﬃcient condition that ensures that a converging equilibrium in under-
accumulation is RC-eﬃcient.
We consider feasible RC-allocations in the sense of the characterization
in lemma 1. Thus, a feasible RC-allocation is defined as a sequence of aggre-
gated variables (Yt, Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0.
The following lemma introduces a new function V and gives its properties.
Lemma 2 The function V (C,D,Z,N) ≡ NU
¡C
N ,
D
N ,
Z
N
¢
defined on R4++ is
concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Its partial derivatives are:
V 01 = U 0c, V 02 = U 0d, V 03 = U 0m and V 04 = U − CNU 0c −
D
NU
0
d − ZNU 0m
with U and its partial derivatives taken at
¡C
N ,
D
N ,
Z
N
¢
.
Proof: see appendix 2.¥
We introduce a new lemma below, which gives a suﬃcient condition that
ensures the RC-eﬃciency of an allocation.
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Lemma 3 Let (Y t, N t, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 be a feasible RC-allocation. Let (βt)
be a sequence, such that ∀t, βt > 0. For a feasible RC-allocation (Yt, Nt, Ct,
Dt, Zt)t≥0, we define the sequence of gains:
gt(Nt, Ct,Dt, Zt) = βt
£
V (Ct, Dt+1, Zt, Nt)−NtU(Ct/N t, Dt+1/N t, Zt/N t)
¤
(28)
If a sequence (βt) exists such that for all feasible RC-allocations (Yt, Nt, Ct,
Dt, Zt)t≥0
lim inf
T→+∞
TX
0
[gt(Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)] ≤ 0 (29)
(Y t, N t, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 is RC-eﬃcient.
Proof: Reductio ad absurdum. Let us assume that (Y t, N t, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 is
not RC-eﬃcient. In that case, it is RC-dominated by a feasible RC-allocation
(Yt, Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0, such that:
∀t ≥ 0, U(Ct/Nt,Dt+1/Nt, Zt/Nt) ≥ U(Ct/N t, Dt+1/N t, Zt/N t)
∃t0 ≥ 0, such that U(Ct0/Nt0 ,Dt0+1/Nt0 , Zt0/Nt0) > U(Ct0/N t0, Dt0+1/N t0 , Zt0/N t0)
For this allocation, when T ≥ t0
TX
t=0
βtNt
£
U(Ct/Nt,Dt+1/Nt, Zt/Nt)− U(Ct/N t, Dt+1/N t, Zt/N t)
¤
≥ βt0Nt0
£
U(Ct0/Nt0 ,Dt0+1/Nt0 , Zt0/Nt0)− U(Ct0/N t0, Dt0+1/N t0, Zt0/N t0)
¤
> 0
and thus:
lim inf
T→+∞
TX
0
[gt(Nt, Ct,Dt, Zt)] > 0
which contradicts the assumption (29).¥
Remark 3 The assumption of the preceding lemma simply means that (Y t,
N t, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 is weakly maximal in the sense of Brock [3]. Indeed, as
gt
¡
N t, Ct,Dt, Zt
¢
= 0, (29) can also be written as:
lim inf
T→+∞
TX
0
£
gt(Nt, Ct,Dt, Zt)− gt
¡
N t, Ct,Dt, Zt
¢¤
≤ 0
No feasible allocation overtakes (Y t, N t, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0.
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The use of aggregate variables in the definition of feasible RC-allocations
(Yt, Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0 is justified for the following reason. By lemma 2, we
know that V is concave. Thus, the function of gain gt is concave. With
the condition (23), the set of feasible allocations is convex. Thus, the op-
timization problem defined by the gain function (28) in the set of feasible
allocations is concave.
The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions for a competitive
equilibrium converging in under-accumulation to be RC-eﬃcient.
Proposition 4 Let
¡
Kt, N t, ct, dt,mt
¢
t≥0 be a competitive equilibrium that
is converging towards a steady state in under-accumulation: R > m. If
φR > w, this equilibrium is RC-eﬃcient.
Proof: see appendix 3.¥
The proof uses lemma 3 with an appropriate choice of the sequence (βt) .
First, we prove that the competitive equilibrium satisfies the first order con-
ditions of the optimization program. The gain function has been defined
by (28) in such a way that makes it possible. Second, we show that the
transversality condition is satisfied if φR > w. This result is consistent with
the intuition from Section 4.3.2: to RC-dominate a competitive equilibrium
converging in under-accumulation, a feasible RC-allocation must lead to a
fertility level that is higher than R. The constraint φR > w rules out this
possibility. Indeed, this inequality implies that, even if all the revenue is
spent on children, the resulting fertility level m = w/φ will be smaller than
R.
Remark 4 The condition φR > w is the same as the assumption made in
Becker and Barro [2]. In their framework, they need this condition to obtain
an equilibrium with operative bequests.
It is important to note that the condition φR > w is stronger than under-
accumulation. Indeed, at the steady state of the competitive economy, we
have: φm ≤ w < φR⇒ m < R.
Remark 5 In an economy endowed with CES production and utility func-
tions, Michel and Wigniolle [11] proves a stronger result. Let τ and ρ respec-
tively be the elasticities of substitution for production and utility functions.
Assume that τ+ρ ≥ 1 (the competitive equilibrium is determined), that τ ≤ 1
(production factors are complements in production) and that the competitive
economy converges in under-accumulation (R > m). Then, if τ + ρ ≤ 2,
the competitive equilibrium is RC-eﬃcient. In this case, underaccumulation
implies RC-eﬃciency.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the eﬃciency of the competitive equilibrium for an
overlapping generations economy with endogenous fertility. We have dis-
cussed the notion of eﬃciency that fit in with endogenous fertility: RC-
eﬃciency or CRC-eﬃciency. We have proved that a competitive equilibrium
that converges in over-accumulation is non-RC-eﬃcient. Using an example,
however, we have shown that under-accumulation is not a suﬃcient condi-
tion for ensuring RC-eﬃciency: a competitive equilibrium that converges in
under-accumulation can be non-RC-eﬃcient. Finally, we have proved a suf-
ficient condition ensuring the RC-eﬃciency of the competitive equilibrium.
Appendix 1: proof of proposition 3.
With a log linear utility function given by (24), we can use equations
(17), (18), (19) and (21) with constant values for γi, i = 1, 2, 3. We assume
that the competitive equilibrium is in under-accumulation. This property is
expressed by the condition:
R > m = γ3w
φ
⇔ γ3 <
φR
w
(30)
We can then build a feasible RC-allocation starting from the stationary
state k0 = k and m−1 = m, such that: ∀t ≥ 1, ct = c, dt = d, mt = m, and
kt satisfies the resource constraint:
mkt+1 = f(kt)− c−
d
m
− φm (31)
In t = 0, as m−1 is given, the resource constraint is:
mk1 = f(k)− c−
d
m
− φm (32)
As d = Rs = Rmk, the term f(k)− d/m is equal to f(k)−Rk = w. Thus,
the precedent condition becomes:
mk1 = w − γ1w − φm
We choose m = µ, with µ defined as µ2 ≡ d/φ = γ2Rw/φ. m = µ is the
value that minimizes the term d/m + φm in equation (31). At each date t,
the condition kt > 0 must hold. As
f(k) > w(k) = Ab
³
k
τ−1
τ + b
´ 1
τ−1 > Ab
τ
τ−1
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we obtain from (32) and (31) suﬃcient conditions that respectively ensure
that k1 > 0 and kt+1 > 0 ∀t ≥ 1:
Ab
τ
τ−1 − γ1w − φµ > 0
Ab
τ
τ−1 − γ1w − 2φµ > 0 (33)
Thus, the only condition that must hold is the last one (33).
Finally, we impose the inequality µ > R, which leads to:
φR/w < γ2 (34)
Conditions (30) and (34) imply: µ > R > m and then U(c, d, µ) >
U(c, d,m). All utilities are higher along the feasible trajectory with mt = µ.
The three conditions (30), (33) and (34) remain to be studied at the limit
when τ → +∞. When τ → +∞, limR = A and limw = Ab.
We assume that: γ3 < γ2. Conditions (30) and (34) become:
γ3 < φ/b < γ2
Condition (33) can be written as:
2φµ < Ab(1− γ1) = Ab (γ2 + γ3)
Taking the square of the precedent inequality, we obtain:
4φ2µ2 = 4φγ2A2b < A2b2 (γ2 + γ3)
2
In setting ε = φ/b− γ3 and replacing φ/b by ε+ γ3, we have:
ε <
(γ2 − γ3)
2
4γ2
Thus, when conditions (26) and (27) in the text are satisfied, conditions (30),
(33) and (34) hold in the limit case when τ → +∞. By continuity, they are
satisfied when τ is large enough.¥
Appendix 2: proof of lemma 2
We can introduce the following notation: X = (C,D,Z,N) . For λ ∈
(0, 1) , we note X = λX1 + (1 − λ)X2, C = λC1 + (1− λ)C2, etc... Thus,
we can write:
V
¡
X
¢
= NU
µ
C
N
,
D
N
,
Z
N
¶
=
= NU
µ
λ
N1
N
C1
N1
+ (1− λ)N2
N
C2
N2
, λ
N1
N
D1
N1
+ (1− λ)N2
N
D2
N2
, λ
N1
N
Z1
N1
+ (1− λ)N2
N
Z2
N2
¶
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As λN1N + (1− λ)
N2
N = 1 and U concave, we have:
V
¡
X
¢
≥ NλN1
N
U
µ
C1
N1
,
D1
N1
,
Z1
N1
¶
+N(1− λ)N2
N
U
µ
C2
N2
,
D2
N2
,
Z2
N2
¶
or finally:
V
¡
X
¢
≥ λV (X1) + (1− λ)V (X2)
Thus, V is concave.
V is twice continuously diﬀerentiable as U. The partial derivatives are
straightforward.¥
Appendix 3: proof of proposition 4
We prove proposition 4 in three steps. First, we make explicit a class of
optimization programs which solutions give RC-eﬃcient allocations. Second,
we prove that a competitive equilibrium satisfies the first order conditions
of such an optimization program. Third we prove that under the assump-
tion given in proposition 4, the transversality condition also holds along the
competitive equilibrium trajectory.
The optimization program
The proof uses lemma 3 with an optimization program associated with
the gain function:
gt(Nt, Ct,Dt, Zt) = βt
£
V (Ct, Dt+1, Zt, Nt)−NtU(Ct/N t, Dt+1/N t, Zt/N t)
¤
for an appropriate choice of the sequence (βt) , and under the two dynamical
constraints:
Yt+1 = F (Yt − Ct − φZt, Zt)−Dt+1
Nt+1 = Zt
From Michel [10], the conditions for weak maximality of this problem are
obtained in using the Lagrangian:
Lt = βt
£
V (Ct,Dt+1, Zt, Nt)− V (Ct,Dt+1, Zt, N t)
¤
+
λt+1 [F (Yt − Ct − φZt, Zt)−Dt+1]− λtYt + µt+1Zt − µtNt
with λt and µt being the shadow prices associated with Yt and Nt.
We will use the abbreviated notations in the sequel:
Ut = U
µ
Ct
Nt
,
Dt+1
Nt
,
Nt+1
Nt
¶
= U (ct, dt+1,mt)
U t = U
¡
ct, dt+1,mt
¢
U 0θ,t = U 0θ
µ
Ct
Nt
,
Dt+1
Nt
,
Nt+1
Nt
¶
= U 0θ (ct, dt+1,mt) with θ = c, d or m
F 0Kt+1 = F
0
K(Yt − Ct − φZt, Zt)
F 0Lt+1 = F
0
L(Yt − Ct − φZt, Zt)
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The first-order conditions are:
βtU 0c,t = λt+1F 0Kt+1 (35)
βtU 0d,t = λt+1 (36)
βtU 0m,t = λt+1
¡
φF 0Kt+1 − F
0
Lt+1
¢
− µt+1 (37)
µt = βt
·
Ut − U t −
Ct
Nt
U 0c,t −
Dt+1
Nt
U 0d,t −
Nt+1
Nt
U 0m,t
¸
(38)
λt = λt+1F 0Kt+1 (39)
The transversality condition is (cf. Michel [10]):
lim sup
t→+∞
³
λteYt + µt eNt − λtYt − µtNt´ ≥ 0 (40)
for all feasible RC-allocations (eYt, eNt, eCt, eDt, eZt)t≥0 leading to a non-infinite
loss with respect to the trajectory (Yt, Nt, Ct, Dt, Zt)t≥0, that is that:
lim inf
T→+∞
TX
0
h
gt(eYt, eNt, eCt, eDt, eZt)− gt(Yt, Nt, Ct,Dt, Zt)i > −∞
As the optimization program is concave, the first order conditions and the
transversality condition are necessary and suﬃcient for weak maximality (in
the sense of Brock [3]). For an appropriate choice of the sequence (βt) ,
if these maximality conditions are satisfied by the equilibrium trajectory
(Y t, N t, Ct,Dt, Zt)t≥0, from lemma 3, this equilibrium is RC-eﬃcient.
The equilibrium trajectory satisfies the first order conditions
We first prove that all the first order conditions are satisfied by the equi-
librium trajectory (Y t, N t, Ct,Dt, Zt)t≥0, when the sequence (βt) is defined
by:
β0 = 1
∀t ≥ 1, βt
βt−1
=
U 0c
¡
ct−1, dt,mt−1
¢
U 0c
¡
ct, dt+1,mt
¢
F 0K
¡
Kt, N t
¢
and for shadow prices, such that:
λt = βtU
0
c,t (41)
µt = −βtU
0
c,tF 0L
¡
Kt, N t
¢
= −βtU
0
c,twt (42)
Equation (39) is satisfied from (41) and the definition of βt. Using (39),
(35) is satisfied from (41). (36) is satisfied, because along the competitive
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equilibrium, the maximization condition (11) is true: U 0c,t/U
0
d,t = F 0K(Kt+1, N t+1).
(38) is equivalent to (42), as, along the competitive equilibrium:
Ct
N t
U 0c,t +
Dt+1
N t
U 0d,t +
N t+1
N t
U 0m,t = U
0
c,t
µ
ct +
dt+1
Rt+1
+ φmt
¶
= U 0c,twt
Finally, (37) can be written:
µt+1 = βtU
0
c,t
Ã
−
U 0m,t
U 0c,t
+ φ− wt+1
Rt+1
!
= −βtU
0
c,t
wt+1
Rt+1
as φ−U 0m,t/U
0
c,t = 0 along a competitive equilibrium. Using (42) in t+1, we
finally find:
−βt+1U
0
c,t+1wt+1 = −βtU
0
c,t
wt+1
Rt+1
which is true from the definition of the sequence (βt) .
Thus, along the equilibrium trajectory, all the first order conditions of
the optimization problem are satisfied. The transversality condition is the
only condition that remains to be proved.
As λtY t + µtN t = βtU
0
c,tN t (wt − wt) = 0, (40) can be written as:
lim sup
t→+∞
βtU
0
c,t
³eYt − wt eNt´ ≥ 0
or:
lim sup
t→+∞
βtU
0
c,t
eNt ³emtekt+1 + ect + φemt − wt´ ≥ 0 (43)
The equilibrium trajectory satisfies the transversality condition
Two cases may occur.
If lim sup
t→+∞
emtekt+1 + ect + φemt − wt > 0, as βtU 0c,t eNt > 0, the transversality
condition is satisfied.
If lim sup
t→+∞
emtekt+1 + ect + φemt − wt ≤ 0, the transversality condition is not
necessarily satisfied. However, if w < φR, ε > 0 exists, such that for t large
enough, φemt < wt < φ(R− ε). Thus, t being large enough, emt < R− ε, and
a constant B exists, such that eNt < B ¡R− ε¢t . As
βtU
0
c,t
βt−1U
0
c,t−1
=
1
Rt
→ 1
R
t→+∞
we finally have:
lim
t→+∞
βtU
0
c,t
eNt = 0
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Thus, the transversality condition is satisfied. We have proved that a compet-
itive equilibrium that converges in under-accumulation towards a stationary
state, such that w < φR is RC-eﬃcient.¥
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